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Stepping stones for biological invasion: A bioeconomic model of transferable risk 
 





Herein we model the widespread dispersal and management of an invasive species as a 
weak-link public good. The risk of introduction is driven in part by economic activity, is 
influenced by policies directed at the risk, and economic activity responds/adapts to the 
risk. Framed around recent introductions and rapid spread of dreissenid mussels in the 
Western United States, we find three key results. First, partial equilibrium estimates of 
welfare loss are significantly overestimated relative to general equilibrium estimates. If 
ecosystem services and market goods are substitutes the partial equilibrium bias is greater 
than if they are compliments. Second, well-intended policies do not necessarily reduce 
overall risk; risk reduction actions can transfer risk to another time or location, or both, 
which may increase total risk. Third, policies of quotas and inspections have to be 
extreme to improve welfare, with inspections having advantages over quotas. 
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1.  Introduction 
We investigate three sources of bias in valuation methods for invasive species risk: 
failure to consider substitution possibilities between goods (partial equilibrium analysis), 
failure to consider nonseparability of ecosystem services with market goods (general 
equilibrium externalities), and failure to consider substitution possibilities between 
ecosystems (spatially transferable risk). The first two biases are known in the literature, 
and we offer insight on the size of the bias for a specific example. Our work on spatially 
transferable risk is novel. We develop the concept in detail and show how it may 
undermine typical invasion prevention strategies. 
  These biases result from failure to integrate feedbacks between the economic and 
ecological systems (e.g., O’Neill 1997, Pimentel et al. 2000, Pimentel et al. 2005). Such 
“partial equilibrium” approaches provide estimates that do not address key interactions 
within the economic system and between human and ecological systems. When these 
interactions are important, general equilibrium methods are more appropriate (Kokoski 
and Smith 1987, Crocker and Tschirhart 1992, Finnoff and Tschirhart 2007, Bossenbroek 
et al. 2009). We show when humans adapt to risk and changes in the ecological system, 
well-intended policies may not reduce overall risk. Risk reduction actions can transfer 
the risk to another time or location, or both, which may not reduce total risk (e.g., Bird 
1987, Shogren and Crocker 1991). The general equilibrium approach presented here 
reveals that policies that reduce nonresident boaters by as much as 95% are sometimes 
required for an overall welfare improvement. Policies that reduce the number of 
nonresident boaters by less than 95 percent can lead to welfare degradations exceeding 
those of doing nothing.    3 
We develop the model within a discussion of recent introductions and rapid 
spread of zebra and quagga mussels (Dreissena polymorpha and D. bugensis, collectively 
referred to here as dreissenids) in the western United States, and the threat of introduction 
into the Columbia River Basin. The Columbia River Basin is well suited to tell such a 
story; we present the model within this context to provide clarity. Our numerical results 
are intended to comment on various modeling approaches, not to serve as impact 
measures of specific policies. We acknowledge the impact measurements are sensitive to 
choices of parameter values and assumptions, and should be treated accordingly (Shoven 
and Whalley, 1984).  
Dreissenids are small freshwater mollusks that arrived in the U.S. through 
shipping channels connecting the East Coast and Europe. Following establishment, 
dreissenids cover surfaces and clog intake pipes for industries dependent on water, 
requiring costly installation of mitigation equipment and additional personnel to monitor 
and control the effects (O’Neill 1997, Connelly et al. 2007). They are also prolific filter 
feeders, causing ecosystem-wide damages in the bodies of water they invade (Marsden 
and Chotokowski 1998; Nalepa 1998; Ricciardi, Neves, Rasmussen 1998; Strayer et al. 
2004). Introduction in the Great Lakes led to rapid spread throughout the Eastern United 
States, but further spread west was slowed by regional policies and geographic isolation 
(Horvath et al. 1996; Johnson, Bossenbroek, Kraft 2006). The Rocky Mountains and the 
Continental Divide separate infested waters in the East from those in the West and have 
provided barriers to natural introduction to the West.   
These natural barriers make the Columbia River Basin an ideal case study for our 
purposes. The Basin is ecologically isolated from, but economically integrated with, other   4 
regions throughout the U.S. The Columbia River Basin is a 675,000 square kilometers 
drainage area in the U.S. Pacific Northwest. It was upgraded to one of six of the Nation’s 
Great Water Bodies in the EPA’s 2006-2011 Strategic Plan, joining the likes of the Great 
Lakes and the Gulf of Mexico (USEPA 2006). Nonresident anglers and boaters spend 
about $1 billion in the local economy each year. (American Sportfishing Association, 
2008). No water bodies in the Columbia are connected with currently invaded bodies of 
water, making human transport the only possible vector of dreissenid introduction.  
The first discovery of expanding dreissenid mussel populations west of the 
Rockies was in 2007, at least 1,600 kilometers west of previously known established 
populations (100
th Meridian Initiative 2007). These new invasions were most likely a 
result of boater movements across the continent (Bossenbroek et al. 2007). New 
beachheads in the Colorado River watershed, however, now threaten the Columbia River 
Basin. We call these new sources of risk as ‘stepping stones’ for invasion. Stepping 
stones are ecosystems that currently pose no direct risk of introduction, but because of 
their ties with invaded ecosystems, may become invaded themselves, and pose an indirect 
risk of introduction. Stepping stones are the greatest source of risk to the Columbia River 
Basin.    
We begin by describing key parts of the bioeconomic model. We then present 
impacts for a dreissenid invasion into the Columbia River Basin. In section 3 we 
investigate the effects of our three biases and show how stepping stones affect the use of 
quotas and inspections to prevent invasion. The final section concludes with research and 
policy recommendations.   5 
2.  Methods 
We use a bioeconomic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to measure 
welfare changes from a dreissenid invasion into the Columbia River Basin and from 
policy measures designed to reduce the risk of invasion into the basin. Threat of invasion 
is modeled using a production constrained gravity model of boater movement and a 
probability function dependent on boater arrivals. Risk of invasion changes the expected 
state of the ecosystem, which affects expected costs to firms and household utility. Firm 
and household reactions are modeled in general equilibrium. These reactions in turn 
affect variables in the gravity model and the probability of invasion, completing an 
adaptive loop between the ecological and economic systems. For brevity we include in 
the text only the features of the model that deviate significantly from standard CGE 
models (e.g., DeMelo and Tarr 1992, Shoven and Whalley 1992). Appendix A provides 
the full mathematical description. Computer code and benchmark data are posted on the 
corresponding author’s website. 
2.1. Threat of invasion 
  Figure 1 illustrates the threats to the Columbia River Basin (C).  Risk of invasion 
comes from two regions, U.S. sources east of the Continental Divide (E) and other 
western basins. The other western basins are the Pacific Northwest excluding the 
Columbia (Pa), California River Basin (Ca), Great Basin (G), Upper Colorado River 
Basin (U), Lower Colorado River Basin (L), and Rio Grande River Basin (R). Let the set 
of all possible basin dreissenid sources be   and the set of all 
western basins be  .   6 
Figure 1. Sources of risk for invasion into the Columbia River Basin 
Until recently, the greatest risk of dreissenid introduction into the Columbia River Basin 
(C) was east of the 100
th Meridian and Continental Divide (E). Additional threats now 
come from the Pacific Northwest excluding the Columbia (Pa), California River Basin 
(Ca) Great Basin (G), Upper (U) and Lower (L) Colorado River Basins, and the Rio 
Grande River Basin (R). Solid lines indicate primary threats of invasion from links with 
the East. Dashed lines indicate secondary threats from links between the Columbia River 
Basin and other western basins. 
 
  The unique features of the Columbia and other basins in the west attract 
thousands of visitors each year. We relax the usual small country assumption for 
recreational export demand and model demand combining a constant elasticity of demand 
curve (Dervis et al. 1982) with a production constrained gravity model (Bossenbroek et 
al. 2007).
* Without dreissenids and under benchmark economic conditions, nij visits by 
boaters from basin i to j are endogenously determined according to forces of attraction in 
                                                 
* Sales of services, such as recreational fishing, to nonresidents are modeled as exports following trade literature on 
consumer services (see for example Deardorff 2005) despite consumption occurring within the Columbia River Basin.   7 
the gravity model - surface area of water, the number of boats housed at the source basin, 
the distance between basins, and the total number of basins N. Boaters react to changes in 
the cost of boating based on elasticities of demand. Changes in cost arise due to 
government pricing policies or due to ecosystem changes that make obtaining a given 
level of boating more expensive (discussed below). Forces of attraction in the gravity 
model shift the demand curve, and price changes cause movements along the demand 
curve. 
The probability of invasion into basin j caused by a boater from basin i is given by 
a binomial distribution 
                (1) 
where Zj is a vector of ecological attributes for basin j that determine its susceptibility to 
invasion, Dij is the number of successful dreissenid invasions from i into j, and qij is the 
per boat probability of invasion. Aggregate probabilities of invasion into a given basin 
are denoted by dropping the source subscript; for example,   is the aggregate 
probability the Columbia Basin becomes invaded from any source. 
If the threat of invasion was only from the East,  . The 
actual probability of invasion into the Columbia, however, depends on the probability of 
invasion into other western basins and the likelihood that these regions serve as stepping 
stones for invasion into the Columbia. Accounting for potential invasion in other basins 
in the West, realized per boat probability of introduction from basin w into the Columbia   8 
is qwCw, and the realized probability of the Columbia becoming invaded depends on total 
boats n entering the Columbia,
†  
                                (2) 
Equation (2) captures the idea behind multiple environmental niche models, which 
suggest Western waters are conducive to the establishment of dreissenids, and major 
waterways would likely be colonized within a few years (Strayer 1991, Drake and 
Bossenbroek 2004, Bossenbroek et al. 2007, Whittier et al. 2008).
‡ Rapid spread and lag 
time between introduction of dreissenids and their discovery imply threats from basins 
even with no current discovery (Costello et al. 2007). Threats in our model are 
understood to be current.  
2.2. The CGE Model  
There are nine producing sectors indexed by   = {state and municipal power 
generation facilities, federal power generation facilities, independent power producers, 
municipal and industrial water users, commercial fishers and hatcheries, irrigated 
agriculture, (non-irrigated) agriculture, recreational angling services, and a catchall 
miscellaneous sector}. Our treatment of household behavior follows Carbone and Smith 
(2008). Nine representative households distinguished by income maximize utility, taking 
the state of the ecosystem as given, subject to budget constraints. Assume the state of the 
ecosystem is nonseparable with market angling services, which together produce 
                                                 
† Our probability calculations are conservative in that the probabilities of invasion between other western basins are 
independent. We do not include the probability of introduction from western basins into other western basins. 
‡ Less than a decade after their discovery in North America (in Lake St. Clair), zebra mussels had spread throughout the 
Great Lakes and down the Mississippi River from Minnesota to New Orleans (USGS 2008).   9 
recreational boating. Ecosystem services provide rents to households and are treated 
similar to rents in Hertel and Tsigas (1997) and Jensen and Rasmussen (2000). 
Households purchase environmental quality at a positive price; the value is then 
transferred back to the households lump sum as income.  
The link between the threat of invasion and the regional economy is through 
visitor export demand (number of boaters).  The external effects of this economic activity 
and its remediation lie at the center of the following analysis.  We investigate general 
equilibrium externalities and experiment with various degrees of substitutability between 
the state of the ecosystem and market goods.   
2.3 Policy Scenarios 
Because no current technology exists to reduce the aggregate abundance of 
dreissenid mussels in natural waterways, eradication policies are likely to be ineffective. 
Policies are only expected to affect the probability of invasion, not the severity. We 
consider quotas and inspection policies aimed at reducing risk of invasion (Shogren 
2000). 
2.3.1. Quotas 
  Establishing a quota on the number of nonresident boaters is a simple and low-
cost method of reducing the number of potentially infected boats. Many states limit the 
number of licenses sold to out-of-state residents for recreational activities such as 
hunting, and limits could be imposed for boating. If a cap of   boaters is imposed, and 
nonresident boaters arrive in proportions equal to those prior to the policy,   10 
                                      (3) 
Naught (0) subscripts indicate benchmark values. Boaters denied entry into the Columbia 
River Basin can launch in other Western waters, increasing the probability these basins 
become invaded and creating sources of risk much closer to home. Boaters who choose to 
launch elsewhere do so based on the parameters of the gravity model (i.e., attractiveness 
and distance) that do not change due to policies in the Columbia River Basin. These 
boaters increase their boating at these locations in equal proportion to their boating prior 
to the Columbia policy,  
                          (4) 
 is the number of boaters turned away from the Columbia River Basin by the 
quota;   is the fraction of boaters traveling to the Columbia who are from 
the East;  is the percentage of turned away boats from the East that launch in other 
basins in the West; and   is the percentage of boats launching in all other 
western basins in the benchmark equilibrium from the East that enter basin w. Equation 
(4) contains only constant parameters and the policy variable for quotas; our treatment of 
entry decisions into other western basins does not include behavioral adjustments 
following a policy in the Columbia.    11 
2.3.2. Inspection 
Enforcement agencies can also undertake boat inspections to reduce the per boat 
probability of an invasion. An inspection policy is captured by the number of boats 
inspected from each region  . Inspections are costly relative to a quota system. These 
costs are financed with fines imposed on infested boats. If an inspection finds mussels, 
the boat is cleaned, fined f, and allowed to enter. Inspections reduce the per boat 
probability of invasion to  
.                              (5) 
Assume boaters from a given region are equally likely to be inspected and fined. Define 
PI as the per inspection cost to the government. A balanced government budget implies 
                     (6) 
The left side of equation (6) is total cost of inspections. The right side of equation (6) is 
expected total revenues from inspections.   is the probability of a boat from basin w 
being infected;   is expected revenue from basin w. Based on their probability of 
inspection and likelihood of carrying dreissenids, boaters calculate their expected fine 
Eb[f] and adjust their demand accordingly,   where   
is the probability of being expected.   12 
2.4 Welfare Analysis 
Vectors of prices in the benchmark scenario b and impact alternate a are given by   and 
. Our comparison of partial and general equilibrium scenarios are defined by the 
number of prices within   that adjust following an invasion (Kokoski and Smith 1987). 
In partial equilibrium, final demand is calculated holding prices in non-impacted sectors 
fixed at benchmark levels. For example, if   is the vector of benchmark 
prices,   is the vector of prices allowing full (general equilibrium) 
adjustment following an impact, and the first two sectors are directly affected by an 
invasion, then our partial equilibrium analysis allows the adjustment  . 
Prices in impacted sectors will be miss-specified relative to prices in non-impacted 
sectors.  
Welfare effects of the impacts of a dreissenid invasion are evaluated in terms of 
compensating variation measures. Define E(P,U) as the unit expenditure function 
associated with achieving utility level U with prices P. Benchmark calibration is done so 
 equals unity. Percentage changes in welfare are  , to which 
we multiply benchmark disposable income for a measure of welfare change in dollars 
(Rutherford 2009).
 
2.5 Data and Parameterization 
Calibration of the gravity model uses national boater movement data and is 
described in Bossenbroek et al. (2007). Probabilities are calculated treating the entire 
invasion history (1988-2007) in the East as one event. We then calculate the probability a 
given basin will become invaded over a similar time horizon. All probabilities are for an   13 
invasion in twenty years. Figures for boater movement are annual and are relative based 
on total U.S. boater movement in the 2004 data year. Cost impacts are annual based on 
risk over the twenty years. The CGE is based on a benchmark dataset from an IMPLAN 
(MIG, 2004 data year 2001) derived social accounting matrix for counties in the 
Columbia River Basin. The recreational fishing sector was created out of the 
miscellaneous sector using data from the American Sportfishing Association (2008). 
They report $1.9 billion in total retail sales from anglers in the Columbia River Basin, 
representing 1.5% of the miscellaneous sector. The same study also reports over 23 
million angler days in the Columbia in 2006. Kaval and Loomis (2003) report $39.70 per 
person per day use values for outdoor recreation. This gives total rents for environmental 
quality of $930 million, or an implied share of environmental quality in recreational 
fishing of one third.  
Power sectors, commercial and recreational fishers, and the region’s irrigated 
agriculture producers will face direct costs to control the mussels, leading to reduced 
capacity and efficiency losses (Armour et al. 1993, Leung et al. 2002, WSTB 2004, 
USEPA 2006). Expected industry-specific increases in unit costs used for this study are: 
federal power (0.30%), state and local power (0.22%), independent power (0.10%), 
irrigated agriculture (0.20%), municipal water (0.12%). Direct costs to hydroelectric 
power plants are based on Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission (PSMFC) 
(Phillips 2005), produced for this project. Impacts to nonfederal hydroelectric facilities 
use the PSMFC report as a baseline and scale impacts according to Northwest Power and 
Conservation Council data on power facilities (July 2005). Impacts to fossil fuel and 
nuclear power generation facilities are based on O’Neill (1997). Impacts to water   14 
treatment plants are based on Deng (1996). Using data from the USDA Census of 
Agriculture (2002) we allocated farming costs between irrigated and non-irrigated 
agriculture and limited direct impacts to pumping mechanisms and control costs at water 
distribution facilities (e.g., those operated by the Bureau of Reclamation) that are likely to 
be passed on to water users. Impacts in commercial fishing follow Rothlisberger, et al. 
(2009). See Warziniack (2008) for detailed calculations of these direct impacts industry.   
Impacts to environmental quality are described by implied prices to obtain a given 
level of environmental quality as it relates to observed changes in demand for 
recreational fishing. Recreational fishing days have declined by about fifteen percent due 
to social changes and ship-borne invasive species in the Great Lakes (Rothlisberger et al. 
(2009). Bennear, Stavins, and Wagner (2005) report an own price elasticity for 
recreational fishing of about -0.25. We assume one fourth of the change reported in 
Rothlisberger et al. is attributed to ecosystem change, implying a 15 percent increase in 
cost of obtaining ecosystem services.
§  
3.  Results  
We first present results relating to the three biases: partial equilibrium analysis, 
separability assumptions, and transferable risk. We then detail how these biases affect 
prevention policies. Table 1 displays price and quantity changes for six model 
specifications. The first column summarizes general equilibrium impacts. The second and 
third columns illustrate the consequences of two partial equilibrium perspectives, the 
second when only prices in impacted sectors are allowed to adjust and the third when 
                                                 
§ The choice to attribute one fourth of the change in fishing to ecosystem services is admittably arbitrary. There is little 
work on how recreational fishing demand changes due to invasive species though much anecdotal evidence suggests it 
is an important driver. The most we can say is that it should be no more than fifteen percent.   15 
only the price of capital and labor adjust. Columns four and five consider the 
consequences of alternative substitutability assumptions in the general equilibrium 
specification.  The fourth column halves the elasticity of substitution between angling 
and ecosystem services, while the fifth doubles the elasticity. The sixth and final column 
presents results when stepping stones are not addressed. 
The bottom row of Table 1 shows the size of each bias, measured as percent 
deviations from the CGE baseline. Although these results are merely intended as an 
illustration, in this example the partial equilibrium bias is larger than ignoring primary 
sources of risk shown in the no stepping stones scenario. In contrast, the bias relating to 
separability is relatively minor.     
Result 1. Partial equilibrium estimates of impacts are biased upwards when ecosystem 
services and market goods are substitutes. 
Support: The biases inherent in partial equilibrium analysis have been shown by Whalley 
(1975) and Kokoski and Smith (1987). Following direct impacts in a given sector, the 
price of the good rises and the relative price of other goods fall. Quantity demanded for 
each good changes, causing factors to be reallocated across sectors, influencing factor 
payments. Partial equilibrium assumptions that do not let the prices of other goods and/or 
the prices of factors adjust discourage substitution away from impacted sectors. Agents 
are exposed to more damages than they would otherwise be under general equilibrium 
assumptions, and welfare measures will be biased accordingly.  
  The first partial equilibrium scenario in column two of Table 1 (simple partial 
equilibrium, ‘SPE’) examines each market in isolation. Direct costs in impacted sectors 
are assumed to pass directly to households in the form of higher domestic prices in those   16 
sectors. Final consumption prices are calculated allowing mixing with imported goods 
following Armington assumptions. From these prices we calculate expenditure functions 
and associated welfare effects. Column three shows the extended partial equilibrium 
treatment (EPE) holding prices in non-impacted sectors fixed but allowing factor prices 
to adjust.  This scenario accounts for reductions in factor demands that accompany 
reductions in demand for goods.  
  Indices for impacted industries Pimpacted, non-impacted Pnon-impacted, and all prices 
Pall are used to compare net effects to prices and quantities in impacted and non-impacted 
sectors. Impacted prices in SPE are similar to the GE scenario, but non-impacted prices 
are considerably higher. Fixing incomes keeps incomes higher in SPE than any other 
scenario, but it is insufficient to offset the price differential. Allowing factors to adjust in 
the EPE. keep prices lower than in SPE, but with reduced income, welfare losses are 
larger under EPE than under SPE.     17 
 
Variable GE  SPE  EPE  GEComp  GESub  GE  w/o 
stepping 
Pimpacted       1.0150       1.0151       1.0145       1.0153       1.0144       1.0103 
Pnon-impacted       0.9997       1.0000       1.0000       0.9997       0.9997       0.9998 
Pall       1.0001       1.0004       1.0004       1.0002       1.0001       1.0001 
Inc. Index       0.9995       1.0000       0.9988       0.9995       0.9995       0.9997 
Probability       1.0000       1.0000       1.0000       1.0000       1.0000       0.6800 
Impact     -64.4634     -88.5470     -89.2493     -67.3046     -58.9312     -44.5054 
Bias -  0.3736  0.3845  0.0441 0.0858 0.3096 
 
Table 1. Comparison of Impact Scenarios 
Price indices are Laspeyres price indices, defined by  . The income 
index is the proportion of benchmark payments to factors. bias = (Scenario Impact - CGE 
impact) / (CGE Impact). 
 
Result 2. Welfare changes are smaller when impacted nonmarket goods are substitutes 
for market goods; larger when nonmarket goods are complements to nonmarket goods.  
Support: Carbone and Smith (2008) address the role of substitutability in what they call 
“general equilibrium externalities”; we show these impacts in the  fourth and fifth 
columns in Table 1. Column four is a repeat of the GE scenario with the elasticity of 
substitution set to half the benchmark value (complements, GEComp) while column five 
has twice the elasticity of substitution (substitutes, GESub). The primary consequence 
follows from the price or recreation (not shown in the table but a component of Pimpacted). 
With less substitutability (GEC), there is less variation in the ratio of demand for 
ecosystem services to angling services following an impact to ecosystem services. When 
the goods are substitutes relative prices send a signal to reallocate consumption to less 
affected sectors. These forces are nonexistence when the relationship is complementary.   18 
In the absence of substitution, the price of recreation rises by more than if substitution 
were possible, and consumption of recreation declines further.  
Result 3. Not addressing the invasive stepping stones biases impacts downward and may 
prevent effective use of quotas and inspections to control risk. 
Support. The last column in Table 1 considers a scenario when sources of invasion in the 
West are not addressed. The result is straightforward - when probability of invasion is 
underestimated, expected impacts are underestimated. More importantly, in the presence 
of stepping stones, policies to control risk, even when all sources of risk are understood, 
may be ineffective. This result matters for the formulation and deployment of policies 
trying to reduce the risk of invasion and has not been addressed in the literature.  Now we 
investigate its implications for the policy alternatives, quotas and inspections. 
3.1 Policy implications of stepping stones    
The policy implications depend on two key factors in the stepping stone idea: 
geographic isolation and economic isolation. Geographic isolation has been the primary 
force preventing a dreissenid invasion in the Columbia River Basin. As aquatic invaders, 
dreissenids eventually die when out of the water,
** leading to a small per boat threat of 
invasion from the East. 
All basins in the West experience some level of economic isolation. 
Transportation costs and amenity differences between basins prevent perfect substitution 
between western basins and with eastern locations. Regionally specific policies such as 
                                                 
** The 100
th Meridian Initiative recommends waiting at least 30 days after boating in dreissenid sources before 
launching in uninfested waterways. This safety window varies with weather conditions. In continuously freezing 
weather, three days is likely to be adequate, and in the dry Southwest, two weeks may be adequate. In cold, but not 
freezing, humid weather in the East, the recommended waiting time exceeds 100 days (100
th Meridian Initiative). This 
window may allow invasion from the East if boats are removed from a source in the East and immediately taken to the 
Columbia River Basin.   19 
quotas and inspections increase economic isolation for the region in question. Because 
the relative cost of angling in other western waters decreases following policies, their 
economic isolation can decrease. In the absence of any policies encouraging additional 
economic isolation, the gravity model estimates 2,005 boaters traveled from dreissenid-
infested waters to the Columbia River Basin prior to the Western invasions in 2007. The 
probability of invasion in the Columbia River Basin was 68 percent, giving a per boat 
probability from the East into the Columbia of   percent. 
The per boat probability is relatively small, but because of the binomial probability 
function the aggregate probability of invasion grows rapidly. For example, the probability 
of invasion reaches 50 percent with only 1,200 boats. Similar per boat probabilities of 
invasion from the East are calculated: see Table 2 for all western basins.  
  
Western basin (w) Boats  traveling 
from East to 
basin (nEw,0) 
Boats traveling 
from basin to 
Columbia (nwc,0) 
Per boat probabilities 
of invasion into basin 
(percent) (qEw) 
Pacific Northwest  170  19881  0.0555  
California River  801  9788  0.0538 
Great Basin  3424  33772  0.0554 
Upper Colorado  851  2049  0.0543 
Lower Colorado  653  1504  0.0546 
Rio Grande  360  101  0.0551 
Table 2. Boater movement and basin probabilities 
 
Quotas: The probability of invasion can rise with stricter quotas (smaller  ) if the rate of 
change in probability of invasion from the West exceeds the rate of change in probability 
from the East. This condition is more likely to hold if 1) the number of boaters to the 
Columbia from the West is high relative to the number of boaters from the East, 2) 
biological conditions are suitable for an invasion into the West, so the per boat   20 
probability of invasion from the East to West qEw is high, 3) the per boat probability of 
invasion into the Columbia from western waters qwC is high relative to that from the East 
qEc, and 4) the marginal change in boaters into the West is high. In the case of the 
Columbia, the first two criteria are satisfied. Boaters from the East represent only three 
percent of nonresident boaters in the Columbia, and biological niche models show most 
western waters to be suitable dreissenid habitat (Strayer 1991, Drake and Bossenbroek 
2004, Bossenbroek et al. 2007, Whittier et al. 2008).  
The third criteria is likely to hold due to shorter transport times and higher 
survival rates of hitchhiking dreissenids to closer western waters. Our gravity model, 
however, predicts lower per boat probabilities of invasion into western basins; western 
basins have relatively fewer distance-independent amenities (e.g., surface area of lakes) 
than the Columbia. The fourth criteria may hold for some but not all western basins. 
Boaters from the East frequent the Columbia in considerably higher numbers than for 
most other basins in the model. The Columbia’s closest neighbors, the Pacific Northwest 
and California Basins, receive few boaters from dreissenid sources, but their proximity to 
the Columbia makes them viable substitutes for anglers faced with strict policies in the 
Columbia. Over 19,000 boaters from the Pacific Northwest and over 9,700 boaters from 
the California visit the Columbia according to the gravity model. Invasion into any one of 
these bodies of water will likely lead to an invasion into the Columbia. Similar conditions 
may exist for the Upper and Lower Colorado River Basins, which are less geographically 
isolated from dreissenid sources than the Columbia. The Great Basin already has a large 
number of boaters arriving from dreissenid sources, so policies in the Columbia are not 
expected to significantly change its probability of becoming invaded.    21 
The affect of a quota on the probability of invasion into the Columbia is 
                                
             A                B           (7)  
In general, the sign of expression (7) is ambiguous (a full derivation is in Appendix B). 
Part A shows how the quota affects the probability of an invasion from the East. Because 
higher quotas allow more boats and increase the probability of invasion from the East, 
Part A is positive. Part B traces the effect of the quota on probability of invasion from 
Western waters, i.e., the stepping stones effect. This effect depends on the change in 
probability of the other basins becoming invaded and the probability of invasion into the 
Columbia should these basins become invaded (see Appendix B). The stepping stone 
effect can be positive or negative, making the net effect of a quota in the Columbia River 
Basin on the probability of invasion into the Columbia is ambiguous.  
Impacts due to quotas affect the region differently than technological changes due 
to a dreissenid invasion. The direct effect of quotas is to reduce demand from regional 
firms, reducing the demand for regional labor and capital. This already occurs at some 
level as visitor demand reacts to the added cost of angler services due to the increased 
cost of obtaining ecosystem services.  
Figure 2 presents results across quota levels accounting with and without stepping 
stones. The ‘No Stepping Stones’ scenario shows the underestimation of damages caused 
by ignoring non-Eastern sources of risk (qwC = 0); the ‘Stepping Stones’ scenario shows   22 
damages with full consideration of other sources of risk and substitutability.
†† All other 
assumptions were maintained between scenarios. Panel A shows changes in welfare 
relative to the full invasion scenario. We aggregated across households by weighting 
percentage change in welfare by share of total population represented by each 
household.
‡‡ Panel B shows probability of invasion, and panel C shows price and income 
indices.  
In the presence of stepping stones, quotas cause welfare to fall below a full 
invasion for all but the strictest quotas. Low quota levels do little to reduce the 
probability of invasion, and reduced visitor spending causes region incomes to fall. 
Reduced demand also causes prices to fall, but not as quickly as incomes. Such policies 
can emerge when stepping stones are not addressed, which causes risk assessment to be 
biased downward and perceived effects of quotas to be come earlier.  Assume welfare 
increases monotonically with the quota level.  
With stepping stones, only for restrictions greater than 91 percent of the original 
number of boaters does welfare improve over a full invasion for all households. It is not 
until 90 percent of boaters are removed (allowing about 7,000 of the original 68,000 
boats to enter) that the probability of invasion falls below 90 percent in the stepping 
stones scenario. In contrast, not considering stepping stones leads to an assumed 
probability of invasion of 68 percent without quotas. Stepping stones are currently the 
                                                 
†† The number of boaters from the East is small compared to the number of boaters that enter from the West, and 
visually one cannot distinguish between the results differentiated by the number of Eastern boaters that launch in other 
western basins. Figure 2 shows welfare losses and the probability of invasion when fifty percent of turned away Eastern 
boaters launch elsewhere in the West ( = 0.5) 
‡‡  , where Vh is indirect 
utility, Mh is income, benchmark b is without quotaa, and alternative a is with quotas.   23 
main threat to the Columbia River Basin. Because a local quota policy cannot control 
launches in other western basins, it is virtually worthless.  
 
 
Figure 2. Comparison of impacts from quotas with and without stepping stones 
 
Inspections: The effect of an inspection on the probability of an invasion into the 
Columbia River Basin is 
                    (8)    24 
which is again ambiguous and derived in the appendix. The sign of the top line of 
equation (8) depends on the marginal effect of inspections on probability of invasion 
from the East. This term is negative, as the per boat probability and the number of boaters 
from the East are reduced. The sign of the bottom expression depends on the marginal 
effect on the probability of invasion with regard to western boaters. Inspections decrease 
the likelihood of an infected boat entering the Columbia River Basin, but because turned 
away boats from the East could decide to launch in the non-Columbia western basins, w 
will rise.  
This is a transfer in risk result for inspections and illustrates how risks may not be 
resolved; rather, they are just transferred through time and space (see e.g., Shogren and 
Crocker 1991). The net effect of an invasion with regards to sources in the West depends 
on the relative size of these two affects, as shown in (A.12), and is ambiguous. As in the 
quota case, equation (8) can be rearranged to show that inspections cause aggregate 
probability of an invasion to rise if the rate of change in probability of invasion from the 
West exceeds the rate of change of probability from the East. Inspections differ from 
quotas, however, according to the number of boats turned away that eventually launch in 
other waters. In our model, expected fines to any one boater are low, so substitution to 
other bodies of water is low, and probability of invasion into other basins is not 
drastically affected. Inspections, because they clean infected boats rather than direct them 
to other basins, reduce the probability of invasion in all basins and are likely to be more 
effective than quotas. 
  Figure 3 shows the results for an inspection policy. Policies that inspect less than 
77 percent of boats cause welfare losses above those of a full invasion in the Stepping   25 
Stones scenario. An inspection policy that ignores western threats, No Stepping Stones, is 
assumed to inspect only boats from the East. Western boaters continue to enter as before 
the policy. Figure 3 shows damages and probability of invasion are biased downward. 
Ignoring stepping stones leads one to believe inspections lead to immediate benefits, 
primarily through increased productivity of factors and higher incomes. By inspecting all 
Eastern boaters policymakers assume all losses are eliminated, though threats from the 
West keep invasion nearly certain and the true expected impacts near the full invasion 
level. Again, we see in the presence of stepping stones, policies focused only on known 
sources are of little use.  
 
          
     
Figure 3. Comparison of impacts from inspections with and without stepping stones   26 
An inspection policy, accounting for all sources of risk, has a number of 
advantages over quotas in the Columbia River Basin. First, because expected fines to any 
one boater are relatively small, the reduction in boaters, and visitor spending, is smaller 
with an inspection policy than with a quota. Second, while both policies have the ability 
to make the situation worse, the size of additional losses are smaller under an inspection 
policy. Third, inspections bring the probability of an invasion down quicker than a quota 
system. Inspecting every boat can remove the threat of invasion while allowing some 
visitors to enter the basin.  
Sensitivity Analysis and Tipping Points:  
In the Columbia River Basin, stepping stones are currently the greatest source of 
risk. The number of boats from other western basins overwhelms the number of boats 
from eastern dreissenid sources. Even small probabilities of invasion into the west imply 
almost certain invasion into the Columbia. This result depends on two parameters: the 
number of boats traveling to western basins (nEw,0) and the per boat probabilities of 
invasion (qEC, qEw, and qwC). A sensitivity analysis was performed on these parameters to 
see when policies imply an increase in risk and when the number of boaters from other 
boaters is too large to control. 
The method assumes the per boat probability of invasion for each basin (qEC, qEw, 
and  qwC) is distributed uniformly, centered on the estimated value (see Table 2) and 
bound by bound by half the estimated value and one and a half times the estimated 
probability of invasion, e.g., qEC ~ U[0.5qEC,0, 1.5qEC,0]. Independent draws from all 
distributions define a scenario. For each scenario, we calculated the probability of 
invasion 1) without prevention policies, 2) with a 50 percent quota policy, and 3) with a   27 
50 percent inspection policy. 500 such scenarios were generated, creating a distribution 
of impacts and probabilities for each policy. We repeated this process for incremental 
increases in the number of boaters originally traveling from the East to western basins 
(nEw,0). Figure 4 shows the resulting average probabilities of invasion for each scenario 
(Panel A) and the frequency each policy led to decreases in the probability of invasion 
(Panel B), across levels of nEw,0 from zero to 15 percent of its original value. 
   
Figure 4. Influences on the number of boaters from East to West on the probability 
of invasion. 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the results. When few boats visit the other western basins, both 
a 50 percent quota policy and a 50 percent inspection policy cause an increase in 
probability of invasion, as risk to the west is mostly from boats turned away from the 
Columbia. As the number of boaters visiting western boaters increases, the marginal 
effect of limiting boaters into the Columbia has little effect on probability of invasion into 
the western basins, and also has little effect on the probability of invasion into the 
Columbia. At 100 percent of the benchmark nEw,0, a 50 percent quota allows 1003 boats 
traveling from the East to enter the Columbia and 33,548 boats traveling from the West to 
enter the Columbia. 500 boats turned away from the Columbia launch into the West. 
Compared to using no prevention policy, quotas increase the average probability 
of invasion for values of nEw,0 less than 10 percent of its original value, and inspections   28 
increase the average probability of invasion for values of nEw,0 less than 4 percent of its 
original value. This represents about 625 and 250 boats traveling from the East to 
Western waters. By 12 percent all quota draws led to decreases in risk over the no policy 
scenario, and by 6 percent all inspection draws led to decreases in risk over the no policy 
scenario. We find policies can be harmful, but only when few visitors are already 
traveling to western waters. At real world levels of boating, policies are not likely to 
increase the probability of invasion because, with stepping stones, probability is already 
near one.  
 
4.  Conclusion  
Our bioeconomic model suggests the annual welfare losses of a dreissenid 
invasion in the Columbia River Basin could be $64 million. Welfare losses in partial 
equilibrium analysis based on the same impact scenario are biased upwards, in this 
example by 37 percent. Summing up damages across industries, as done in partial 
equilibrium, does not address substitution possibilities that act as insurance measures 
within an economic system against catastrophes in one sector. Assumptions about 
substitutability across market and nonmarket goods matter, but to a much less extent. 
Halving the elasticity of substitution led to a 4.5 percent error and doubling the elasticity 
of substitution led to an 8.6 percent error.    
Current prevention efforts decrease expected impacts only if we limit 
consideration to eastern sources of risk. Accounting for sources of risk in the West, 
current prevention efforts do little. New sources of risk overwhelm the threat from the 
East. We find policies to reduce risk of dreissenid invasion into the Columbia River   29 
Basin may transfer risk of invasion to other river basins in the West. If these basins 
become invaded the outlook for the Columbia is even bleaker. Nearby infested waters can 
serve as stepping stones for eventual invasion into the Columbia River Basin. If the 
potential for invasion in the other western basins and the number of boats traveling 
between these basins and the Columbia are high, risk reduction policies will be 
counterproductive. Expected damages will rise.  
Inspections outperform quotas and allow visitors to fish Columbia River Basin 
waters and reduce the probability of invasion quicker than quotas. Reducing the 
probability of invasion should be a priority because the damages of a dreissenid invasion 
are irreversible. A uniform effort between agencies of inspecting boats and installing 
wash stations at launch sites would reduce the probability of invasion per boat, and be 
more effective at reducing expected impacts than a decrease in the number of boats. 
Uniform efforts are particularly important due to the weak-link nature of maintaining 
ecosystem services. Lack of cooperation at any geographic or agency level can transfer 
the risk of invasion from one basin to another and do little to mitigate damages.  
The oversight required to ensure compliance adds costs to anglers and 
government and raises the question of the ‘appropriate’ probability of invasion. The 
political will supporting these actions could increase, however, because the alternative is 
to impose significant costs on a few key industries, e.g., power and municipal water, and 
to increase the long term impacts of a dreissenid invasion on recreational water users and 
regional tourism. A full cost-benefit analysis would have to consider these administrative 
costs and the impact measures presented in this paper.    30 
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Appendix B. Marginal changes in probability 
B.1 Probability of invasion with a quota 
Let   be the total number of boats allowed into the Columbia River Basin. The 
numbers of boaters from each basin continue to arrive in equal proportions as they did 
prior to the invasion, given by equation (3). Equation (4) gives the number of boats from 
the East that now travel to other basins in the West. 
With the quota probability of invasion is 
 for i,j = Ca, G, Pa, U, L, and R.     (A.1) 
Taking the derivative with respect to the quota level 
  
                 (A.2) 
The marginal change on the probability from boaters from the East in unambiguously 
positive, 
         (A.3) 
The marginal change on probability for other boaters is   33 
        (A.4) 
Note that  , which we use to get 
         (A.5) 
Raising the quota in the Columbia River Basin keeps fewer boats from infested areas in 
the East from entering other basins in the West, decreasing the probability that they 
become invaded,  . The first term is positive. Because  , the second 
term is negative. The sign of the whole term is ambiguous, which implies equation (A.2) 
is ambiguous as well. 
B.2 Probability of invasion with inspections 
The probability of an invasion with an inspection policy is given by equation (5), which 
can be written in terms of total inspections,   34 
           (A.6) 
Taking the derivative with respect to the inspection level 
           (A.7) 
The bottom term depends on the effect of inspections on the probability of invasion from 
the East and is negative. Higher inspection rates lower the probability of invasion from 
the East. 
       (A.8) 
The top term of (A.7) depends on the effect of inspections on the probability of invasion 
from the West 
    (A.9)   35 
Looking at the effect of inspections on probability of invasion from a representative 
basin, 
   (A.10) 
, so the first term will be negative. The second term will be positive because 
. Once again, the net effect on the probability will be ambiguous 
depending on the tradeoff between reducing the per boat probability and increasing the 
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